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Abstract
This article compares and contrasts the nature and scope of change in the domestic 
climate governance of India and South Africa between 2007 and 2010. It identifies 
the actors and networks driving these change processes by applying the concepts of 
“communities of practice” and a simple, resource exchange–based network. Small 
communities of practice promoting collective learning, trust, and identity building 
capture the trends and actor relations well for the South African case. More simple, 
business-driven networks could be identified in India. Using survey and interview 
data, this article finds that both countries have generally not undergone a structural, 
transformative change, yet that includes the collective learning of new norms and 
values. Differences exist for more specific parts of climate governance. The number 
of participating actors, the character of the scientific landscape, and the centrality of 
a governmental actor with a certain knowledge and attitude within a network shape 
these different change processes.
Keywords
climate change, governance, communities of practice, networks, India, South Africa
Introduction
It is widely recognized that a change towards low-carbon development is required for 
an effective governance of climate change. This presents a special challenge for the 
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so-called BASIC countries—Brazil, India, South Africa and China—that have 
received a lot of attention during the last rounds of the international climate change 
negotiations. These emerging economies are not only gaining weight in the interna-
tional political system but also have a growing impact on ecosystems while they 
struggle to sustain economic growth and development. This article focuses on the 
actors and driving forces of change at the domestic level of climate governance in 
India and South Africa.
As international progress remains slow, networks play an increasingly important 
role in the evolution of climate governance on various levels. They are important for 
enhancing adaptive capacity and local communities’ resilience, for instance, and for 
decreasing societies’ vulnerability to the impacts of climate change (e.g., Adger, 
Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; Folke, Hahn, Olsson & Norberg, 2005). The connection 
between networks, learning, and change is promising for climate governance, as con-
tributions by natural resource management have shown (Armitage, 2008; Olsson et al., 
2006; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Constructivist approaches focusing on ideas, norms, and 
knowledge make this connection stronger as well (Broadbent, 2010), for example by 
analyzing the role of knowledge brokers (Ascher, Steelman, & Healy, 2010).
For practitioners, the identification of relevant actors, their power, relationships, 
knowledge, and attitudes supports the targeting of capacity building. Understanding the 
underlying background and the functioning of (in)formal domestic governance systems 
enables better outcomes of climate programs promoting low-carbon development.
Comparative, comprehensive assessments of the nature of change in domestic cli-
mate governance in the BASIC countries and other major carbon emitters among 
developing countries—and an analysis of the actors behind it—are rare. This is par-
ticularly true for India and South Africa. Here, existing research focuses on International 
Relations questions, equity, and the Clean Development Mechanism (Benecke, 2009; 
Hallding et al., 2011; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; Rajan, 1997; Stevenson, 
2011; Vihma, 2011), discusses emission trajectories and possibilities for mitigation 
(e.g., Goldblatt, 2010), or provides case studies of local adaptation practices (Roberts, 
2010). More encompassing assessments of overall climate governance do not suffi-
ciently take into account the networks between various actor groups (Dubash, 2009; 
Koch, Vogel, & Patel, 2007; Rajamani, 2009).
Dubash (2009) and Rajamani (2009) identify three major actor groups in Indian 
domestic climate policy: “Growth first stonewallers” promote the traditional foreign 
policy position that climate change has to be dealt with by the North only (Dubash, 
2009, p. 9). Progressive realists and progressive internationalists support cobeneficial 
approaches and recognize that India needs to act domestically. The former propose to 
delink domestic and global positions and actions (keeping the hard-line position inter-
nationally); the latter want to link them progressively (Dubash, 2009, p. 9). Although 
the authors shed light on the attitudes of these actor types in a helpful way, individual 
network-type relationships and the potential role of learning do not come into focus. 
In a similar fashion, Hallding et al. (2011) provide useful indications of individual 
actor relations at the domestic level, particularly on South Africa. But their main 
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purpose remains a comparative foreign policy analysis of the BASIC. Domestic 
change processes are thus not fully understood yet.
The aim of this article, then, is to close an empirical research gap concerning 
domestic change processes. The empirical data will be connected to current theoretical 
trends. The concept of “communities of practice” (Adler, 2005, 2008) versus a basic 
version of social network analysis will be given an exploratory test of fit. Depending 
on which concept better captures what is going on in India and South Africa, the prac-
tical support of climate governance can be better directed. This article asks three sub-
sequent questions: Has a change in domestic climate governance taken place in India 
and South Africa? If so, how far-reaching is it? And, finally, who drives this change?
The article is structured into five sections. The first section presents the theoretical 
framework by briefly outlining the approach of communities of practice based on 
Adler (2005, 2008) and contrasting it with formal network analysis. I thus take an 
actor-centered approach, concentrating on period between 2007 and 2010. Since the 
publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report in early 2007 (IPCC, 2007) a general, renewed political momen-
tum can be observed. The second section explains the mixed-methods approach. A 
series of semistructured interviews and the results of an expert survey build the foun-
dations for empirical analysis. The third and fourth sections present the empirical 
results. Here, the former focuses on the existence and nature of change in both coun-
tries’ domestic climate governance and the latter analyzes the actors and actor groups 
that drive these processes. The concluding section discusses the results’ implications 
for research and practice.
Some Background
As members of the BASIC group, India and South Africa share certain climate 
change–related characteristics, but they also differ somewhat in their socioeconomic 
background. First, the size of the population is very different. India has approximately 
1.3 billion inhabitants, whereas South Africa has a population of 50 million people. 
Their overall level of development is similarly low, captured by the Human 
Development Index (HDI). South Africa ranked 110th and India 119th of 169 coun-
tries captured in the HDI 2010.1 The income is less equally distributed in South Africa 
than in India: South Africa’s income Gini coefficient for 2010 was at 57.8 and India’s 
at 36.8 (0 = total equality, 100 = total inequality). However, India’s economy is much 
larger than South Africa’s economy and it grows at a much higher rate of 8% on aver-
age in the past 5 years (compared to 3% in South Africa).2 In 2010, South Africa’s 
gross domestic product per capita was at 10,140 U.S. dollar (purchasing power parity 
[PPP]) and India’s at 3,354 U.S. dollar (PPP). In the World Bank classification, South 
Africa therefore belongs to the group of higher-middle-income countries and India to 
the lower-middle-income countries.3
India’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are among the highest of the world, 
but its per capita emissions are low. To counter poverty, India needs to sustain an 
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economic growth of around 9% over the next 20 years, which would increase the pri-
mary energy supply needs 4 to 5 times and electricity generation 6 to 7 times com-
pared to 2004.4 Since the Indian economy is largely based on electricity produced 
from coal of low quality, GHG emissions will increase rapidly. Currently, 69% of 
electricity is generated from coal; the rest is a mix of oil, nuclear, and renewable 
energy sources.5 India already has 20 nuclear plants and plans to build more, whereas 
South Africa has only one thus far. Electricity generation accounts for the bulk of 
India’s emissions (38%) followed by the iron, steel, and cement industries (22%) and 
agriculture (18%). Projections of per capita emissions in 2031 range from 2.77 to 5 
tons CO2e (currently at an average of 1.4 tons) and total emissions of 4 to 7 billion 
tons CO2e, which would be a three- to four-fold increase.6 The projected impacts of 
climate change vary according to the different climatic zones of the Indian subconti-
nent. Changes in monsoon patterns, impacts on water resources (including the Himalaya 
glaciers), and agriculture, as well as the increase in extreme weather events and sea-
level rise, are likely to be the most severe impacts (Indian Network of Climate Change 
Assessment [INCCA], 2010).
South Africa’s GHG emissions in total are lower than India’s, but per capita emis-
sions are well in the ranks of an industrialized country. The emission profile is strongly 
linked to South Africa’s economic structure and electricity generation from coal. 
While the coal in South Africa has higher quality than in India, 85% of electricity is 
generated from it (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2011). Generally, electricity 
in South Africa is cheap and industry, therefore, is very energy- and emission-intensive. 
In 2000, South Africa’s national net GHG emissions were at 415 million tons CO2 eq 
(Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios [LTMS], 2008): 78% come from energy (fuel com-
bustion, also in the industries and fugitive fuels); 14% from industrial processes; 6% 
from agriculture, land use, and forestry; and 2% from Waste. Projections see emis-
sions increasing up to approximately 1.5 billion tons of CO2 eq till 2050 if the devel-
opment plans of 2007 would be kept unchanged (LTMS, 2008). The sectors with the 
highest vulnerability to the impacts of climate change are most likely to be water, 
biodiversity, agriculture, health, and some coastal areas that will be affected by rise in 
sea level, flooding, and change of currents (Akoon et al., 2010).
Theoretical Framework: From  
Networks to Communities of Practice
Communities of Practice and Cognitive Evolution
This section introduces Emmanuel Adler’s (2005, 2008) cognitive evolution approach 
and its central category “communities of practice.” Drawing on Etienne Wenger 
(1998), Adler provides a practice-oriented, communitarian view on political change. 
Communities of practice are informal networks whose members are not only bound 
by the exchange of information but by a sense of joint enterprise or a common iden-
tity. The identity slowly develops through members’ engagement with each other. 
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Essentially, communities of practice are learning networks that develop and share new 
ideas, knowledge, and practices. Even though Adler does not use the term “trust” 
explicitly, members’ relationships are characterized by it. Trust develops between 
individual members and as a group characteristic. Members of communities of prac-
tice can have diverse professional backgrounds and cross-cut organizational and 
geographical boundaries.
The function of communities of practice does not end with learning within the com-
munity. It also matters what they actually, practically do and achieve. Through the 
process of cognitive evolution, they are important for changing the dominant political 
mindset and the background knowledge that actors refer to (Adler, 2005, 2008). This 
background knowledge frames action. Cognitive evolution means the process of col-
lective, social learning through which communities of practice expand their influence 
and induce change. It also describes how communities of practice get established and 
how the new background knowledge that they produce (the shared ideas, knowledge, 
and practices) becomes institutionalized. This, in turn, changes social structures and 
the context on which governance actors base their perceptions, decisions, and actions.
Several factors facilitate political change: (a) the expansion of communities of 
practice, (b) the inclusion of key policy makers or other critical individuals, (c) the 
acceptance of new knowledge and practices by government networks, and (d) the 
passing of a tipping point or cognitive threshold (Adler, 2005, 2008). Adler sometimes 
uses the rather fuzzy term “cognitive authority” to describe power but also follows the 
well-established definition of Barnett and Duvall (2005). They differentiate between 
compulsory, structural, institutional, and discursive power. This definition is convinc-
ing because it combines a resource- and process-based perspective as well as positivist 
and postpositivist dimensions.
Adler’s understanding of political change as the transformation of the context, 
beliefs, and values that shape reality is similar to triple-loop learning (Pahl-Wostl, 
2009) or third-order change (Hall, 1993). Single-loop learning—or first-order change—
is a simple shift of strategies. Double-loop learning—or second-order change—alters 
underlying assumptions, goals, and priorities but within structural constraints (Pahl-
Wostl, 2009, p. 322). Pahl-Wostl connects triple-loop learning with informal networks 
to explain change in resource governance. Her inclusion of feedback loops and reflex-
ivity represents an advantage over Adler’s approach. I follow her understanding that 
change has different orders, requires different stages of learning, and, therefore, can 
only be measured in a gradual, comprehensive way and not dichotomously. To assess 
the stage of loop learning, I draw on Pahl-Wostl’s typology of changes (e.g., regarding 
institutions, uncertainty, or governance mode). If Adler’s approach accurately cap-
tures the developments in India and/or South Africa, fostering trust and identity build-
ing along with collective learning processes could strongly benefit capacity building 
efforts. If they do not form by themselves, it might be useful to initiate communities 
of practice such as organizations like the World Bank already do (Adler, 2008). There 
are more than a hundred so-called Thematic Groups that are organized as communities 
of practice with the goal of promoting learning, best practice exchange, and innovation 
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within the World Bank. A small number of communities of practices with mixed 
membership, composed of World Bank employees, partner organizations, and exter-
nal audiences, additionally enhance outreach and information dissemination.7
Differences and Similarities to Network Analysis
Generally, networks can be described as a set of ties between a set of actors that may 
change over time; network analysis is thus interested in relationships and structures 
(Wasserman & Faust, 2008). Since networks can be formal or informal, communities 
of practice could be understood as a certain type of informal network.
There are two broad groups of network analyses—formal or social network analy-
sis and more descriptive approaches—that have been criticized for using networks as 
a “heuristic device” (Christopoulos, 2008). My reflections mainly target formal social 
network analysis. It primarily explains the relationships between actors and network 
developments through structural characteristics—at the level of ties between two 
actors, through group structure or positional measures. Social network analysis is 
interested in what happens inside the network and how this may explain the develop-
ment of networks over time. Some descriptive approaches of network analysis have 
taken the whole network as an actor (independent variable) in order to analyze their 
impacts on policy (Kahler, 2009; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In contrast to formal social 
network analysis, Adler’s communities of practice and cognitive evolution are more 
interested in how the communities induce and affect change processes outside the 
network.
Further characteristics that separate communities of practice and social network 
analysis are: (a) the “we feeling”/identity building, (b) a general sense of trust, and 
(c) the definition of power. Social network analysis targets questions of identity and 
trust as well, but—if not combined with other methods—analyses them from a 
rational-structural perspective of resource exchange and dependency (e.g., Compston, 
2009). This conflicts somewhat with constructivist arguments, as it may (but does not 
have to) imply a competitive, even game-theoretical, situation within the network.
Trust in social network analysis is measured at the dyadic level between two actors 
and in some studies as an expression of general trust in colleagues or in an organiza-
tion as a whole (Luo, 2005). Collective-level trust or the cultural elements of trust have 
not received enough attention in social network analysis (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Levin 
& Cross, 2004). The building of background knowledge that eventually spreads 
beyond communities of practice is a concept that seems to be hard to measure through 
quantitative-based network approaches.
Identity building in social network analysis is measured through tie strength and 
attribute-based measures such as homophily or closure/transitivity. Even though this 
could present a helpful addition to constructivist approaches (Hafner-Burton et al., 
2009), shared attributes of actors or affiliations do not guarantee a common identity in 
political science terms. Hence, applications would have to be made with care.
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Finally, social network analysis’ understanding of power differs from Barnett & 
Duvall’s understanding outlined above because it is related to structural positions 
within the network only (e.g., Burt, 1992). Although social network analysis and com-
munities of practice overlap in terms of key individuals (who may or may not be in a 
central broker position), the application of a network-type approach to explain change 
outside of the network requires a more encompassing definition of power.
If the drivers of political change rather conform to more simple, resource exchange–
based networks without group trust and identity building, then capacity building pro-
grams may want to focus more on providing the sought-after resources, for example, 
technology or funding. For the comparative assessment below, I use these basics 
(structures, relational measures, and resource exchanges) but do not provide a full 
quantitative formal social network analysis.
Method
This article uses a mixed-methods approach to measure change in India’s and South 
Africa’s domestic climate governance and to explore the actors—and their connections—
behind the developments. Change will be assessed via the regulation density, the 
results of an expert survey, and qualitative answers from a number of semistructured 
interviews. In South Africa, 35 interviews were conducted between January 20 and 
March 13, 2010 and 30 interviews in India between October 8 and November 25, 
2010. The expert judgments and the interviews also serve the identification of actors 
and their roles and connections. Results will be integrated in a concurrent triangula-
tion in order to achieve higher validity (Creswell, 2008).
Expert judgments or surveys generate a consensus opinion on a phenomenon or 
problem otherwise hard to observe or analyze directly (Benoit & Wiesehomeier, 
2009), such as the nature of change and collective learning processes here. The selec-
tion of experts—and their actual expertise and authoritative knowledge—is more 
important than the number of participants. Here, the number and quality of publica-
tions, activities, and reputation of experts served as benchmarks for the validity of the 
survey (Benoit & Wiesehomeier, 2009). These were assessed beforehand. In addition, 
a number of questions in the survey regarding the participant’s years of experience in 
the field, major events in the respective country’s climate policy developments, and 
their projected climate change impacts completed the evaluation of the level of exper-
tise of each participant. Policy makers do not qualify as experts because they usually 
do not possess the same profound specialist knowledge the expert does. Experts advise 
policy makers in a professional manner, but they do not take political decisions them-
selves. In the interviews, a wider range of policy makers, companies, and NGOs were 
included.
The number of respondents in India (10 experts) and in South Africa (13 experts) 
surpassed the minimum number of five experts set in other expert surveys (Ray, 1999). 
Of the 13 experts in South Africa, 8 are academics (both social scientists and natural 
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scientists), 4 are consultants, and 1 has a legal background. The professional back-
ground of the Indian experts is similar: six are academics, three are experts from think 
tank–type NGOs, and one is a consultant. Anonymity has been agreed on with each 
interviewee.
For the purposes of this article,8 the following criteria guided country and case selec-
tion, approximating to a structured, focused comparison (George & Bennett, 2005):
1. Significant and rising emissions of greenhouse gases (cumulative and/or per 
capita).
2. Ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, but no mandatory emis-
sion reductions yet.
3. Similar projections concerning the impacts of climate change and the high 
degree of overall vulnerability of the society.
4. Similar form of political system and administration.
5. A certain weight and activity in international climate negotiations. This 
should guarantee a minimum of interest in a political handling of climate 
change.
The difference in per capita GHG emission between India (low) and South Africa 
(high) does not impede a comparison as cumulative emissions are high in both 
countries.9
Despite the strong links between levels of climate governance, international cli-
mate negotiations and international peer pressures are treated as external constraints 
for the purposes of this article. India has been a traditional nay-sayer in the climate 
negotiations (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011), and post-apartheid South Africa 
seeks to act as a “bridge-builder” (Atteridge, 2011). Apart from this, the number of 
publications stressing the North–South divide in the climate negotiations, its history, 
and implications is high. Thus, shifting domestic reasoning to the center provides a 
fresh perspective.
The time period of analysis is January 2007 to December 2010. The momentum of 
international climate governance and, therefore, potential change in domestic climate 
governance increased significantly from approximately 2006-2007 onwards. Analysis 
is restricted to the national level of governance and includes the big business sector 
only. The cases of this article, therefore, are India and South Africa and, more pre-
cisely, their national level of domestic climate governance between 2007 and 2010.
The Development of Domestic  
Climate Governance and the Scope of Change
Regulation Density and Other Governance Mechanisms
This section describes the main developments in India’s and South Africa’s domestic 
climate governance between 2007 and 2010 and assesses whether a change has taken 
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placed based on the regulation density. Knill, Schulze and Tosun (2010) split regula-
tion density into the amount of policies over time and the amount of governmental 
instruments—such as taxation—over time. I neglect their second dimension of mea-
surement for policy change, regulation intensity, because it relates to the severity and 
the impact of the regulations. This is hard to measure since it would require an up-to-
date measurement of GHG emissions.
South Africa developed its first National Climate Change Strategy of 2004 (South 
Africa, 2004), but no concrete measures were implemented. The first national climate 
change conference in Midrand in 2005 led to the “Midrand Plan of Action,” which was 
largely a statement of intent. Actual political momentum only occurred from approxi-
mately 2007 onwards. In December 2007, the ruling party African National Congress 
(ANC) adopted a declaration on climate change for the first time (ANC, 2007). 
Although not a concrete policy step, this lifted climate change onto the ANC agenda 
and certainly raised awareness among ANC policy makers. In July 2008, the Long-
Term Mitigation Scenario was published (LTMS, 2008). The LTMS is a scientific 
document that lays out different possible options for mitigating South Africa’s emis-
sions. In November 2010, a Green Paper on South Africa’s national climate policy 
was published that became a White Paper in October 2011 (published as legislation in 
January 2012). It includes steps toward the development of a specific adaptation 
policy—a neglected side of national climate governance thus far.
Following its goal to conduct an environmental fiscal reform (South Africa 
Treasury, 2010), Treasury introduced a charge of 2 cent10/kwh on nonrenewable elec-
tricity in 2009, a small carbon tax on new vehicles in October 2010, and published a 
discussion paper for the introduction of a widespread carbon tax in December 2010.
These measures promise to lead toward the 34% emission reduction goal (com-
pared to the “business-as-usual scenario” signed in the Copenhagen Accord) and to 
enhance adaptation. Also, nearly all government departments at the national level now 
have a climate change appointee or a climate change team. With respect to business, 
awareness and activities are picking up, but more in terms of mitigation than of adap-
tation (Vogel, 2009).
Some elements of energy governance are cobeneficial to climate change. They are 
often redeclared as part of South Africa’s climate change response. The Energy 
Efficiency Accord of 2005 is a voluntary public-private partnership that is cobeneficial 
to climate protection. The Demand-Side Management program of the parastatal elec-
tricity provider Eskom is another such measure. Finally, the introduction of a renewable 
energy feed in tariff (REFIT) serves climate governance goals as well, but difficulties 
in integrating South Africa’s energy and climate governance exist (Tyler, 2010).
With respect to private governance, large, transnational companies are responding 
to the Carbon Disclosure Project survey on companies’ GHG emissions and climate 
change activities. The response rate has been consistently high between 2007 and 2010 
(Carbon Disclosure Project [CDP] Reports, n.d.). The National Business Initiative 
(NBI) promotes business action on climate change and has organized a series of work-
shops following the National Summit on Climate Change in 2009. Several companies 
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have started to engage in climate change projects or sponsor research chairs on climate 
change, for instance, the mining company Exxaro (Exxaro, 2010). The number of 
registered CDM projects has increased from 8 projects in 2007 to 18 projects at the 
end of 2010 (South Africa Department of Energy, 2011). The overall number of poli-
cies, strategies, and other governance initiatives has thus clearly increased between 
2007 and 2010.
For the beginning of 2007, no comprehensive domestic Indian climate policy can 
be identified. The country could, however, draw on already existing energy efficiency 
and renewable energy policies. In October 2007, the Bureau of Energy Efficiency 
(BEE) published a paper discussing issues of energy security and climate change and 
how existing programs benefit adaptation to climate change (BEE, 2007). This article 
argues that 2% of India’s GDP is already spent on measures and programs that are 
cobeneficial to climate governance. A reliable check of this figure was not possible.
In 2008, the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change published the National 
Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). It is composed of eight broad missions that 
include mitigation, adaptation, and research promotion. Each of these missions has 
been assigned to one or more ministries at the national level. They are responsible for 
the development of more specific measures and their implementation in each of the 
federal states. According to almost all interview partners, only the National Mission 
on Energy Efficiency and the Solar Mission have really taken off in terms of concrete 
planning, financial investments, and steps toward implementation at the subnational 
level. Both of these missions draw on existing policies and initiatives. The energy 
efficiency mission, for example, includes a star rating system for appliances and the 
Performance, Achieve, & Trade (PAT) Scheme, which is a market-based mechanism 
that enables the trading of energy-saving certificates among large industries. Both 
measures are based on the Energy Conservation Act of 2001. The other missions under 
the auspices of the NAPCC were in different stages of planning and finalization as of 
November 2010.
In 2009, the Ministry of Environment and Forests published a document outlining 
20 initiatives that are cobeneficial to climate governance (MoEF, 2009). The Low-
Carbon Expert Group, set up by the Planning Commission in 2010, is supposed to 
develop strategies and policy input for the transition to a low-carbon economy that 
feeds into the central government’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2017). The submission 
of a final report to the Planning Commission on this topic was expected for March 
2011. The effective functioning of the CDM and the growing renewable energy busi-
ness sector imply that India’s approach is mainly a business-oriented one. The number 
of CDM projects has increased from 83 registered projects in 2007 to 650 projects in 
201011—only China hosts more. Indian companies also report to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project but have significantly lower response rates, even though these increased from 
2007 to 2010 (CDP Reports, n.d.).
Private governance initiatives exist as well. The two Chambers of Commerce—
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the 
Confederation of Indian Industries (CII)—both now have climate change task forces. 
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CII has set up a Green Business Center that promotes the development and exchange 
of best practices. Like their South African counterparts, several Indian companies 
have started projects and support research related to climate change. Overall, the regu-
lation density in India increased between 2007 and 2010 as well.
Whereas South Africa already had a national climate strategy by 2007, India had 
more policies and strategies that turned out to be cobeneficial to start with. The regula-
tion density thus seems to be slightly higher in India, but there is hardly any difference 
in terms of direct, comprehensive policies and instruments targeting climate change. 
The increase of the regulation density in both countries supports the assumption that a 
change has taken place between 2007 and 2010 and is still ongoing. But it does not tell 
us enough about the nature and degree of change, which is expected to differ.
Nature and Scope of Change: Results From Different Data Sources
The differentiation into orders of change and loop-learning, including the production 
of new background knowledge, requires a comprehensive assessment of climate gov-
ernance developments in India and South Africa. This section integrates the findings 
of interviews and the expert survey that target awareness, knowledge, and learning as 
well as actors’ roles, interests, and governance actions or practices.
Interviewees were asked whether something had changed in climate governance in 
the past 2 to 3 years and if so, to describe what it was. In South Africa, most saw an 
increase in awareness and a different perception of climate change as a challenge. 
They emphasized that climate change was not much of a topic before, either for gov-
ernment or business, that people did not talk or know about it or did not take seriously. 
Some identified a rift between knowledge and practice, and others highlighted the 
positive examples of action or said that people are at different points on the learning 
curve. The knowledge that actors have about climate change12 (a basic understanding 
of the science and technology questions or a normative position) is not evenly distrib-
uted. Those experts and actors directly working on climate change have a good knowl-
edge of the science and want to do something about climate change. Some governance 
actors outside of these circles—from government and administration and business—
share this kind of knowledge as well, but not all. The understanding of mitigation 
issues is generally better than of adaptation. A member of government/administration 
states that “the level of consciousness of people at a key level has gone up and even 
ordinary people see the impacts now. . . . Awareness is picking up everywhere, but 
we’re not at the required level yet.”13 Media attention to the topic was also said to have 
increased a lot from about 2007 onwards.
Members of government as well as scientists stressed that there is an increased need 
for scientific information and feasible solutions—both to help overcome uncertainty 
and to guide governance processes. The interviews as well as an analysis of policy 
documents and literature shows that there is a clear shift in awareness, perceptions, 
and potentially a general understanding of climate change related to new background 
knowledge among the central actors in government and business. This applies to parts 
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of the general public as well. Differences according to specific types of knowledge 
exist (Never, 2012). A parallel increase in debate among and actions by governance 
actors points toward a collective learning process. To some extent, these findings con-
tradict existing analyses proclaiming a generally insufficient level of awareness and 
sparse media coverage (Hallding et al., 2011, p. 50).
The expert survey confirms the interview results. There was a nearly unanimous 
consensus among experts that (a) the general attitude toward climate change, (b) the 
self-understanding (role) of South Africa, (c) the definition of actors’ interests relating 
to climate change questions, and (d) South Africa’s position in international negotia-
tions changed between 2007 and 2010. There was only one deviant opinion concern-
ing the definition of actors’ interest. The consensus of experts saw a change happening 
from about 2007 onwards, with acceleration in the run-up to the Copenhagen confer-
ence in December 2009. The publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC, the ANC declaration in Polokwane, and the LTMS process counted as mile-
stones for this process of change.
All but one expert on India also agreed that (a) a change is taking place concerning 
the general attitude toward climate change, and for (b) the definition of actors’ inter-
ests and (c) India’s self-understanding, 70% of experts saw a change and 30% did not. 
Concerning a change in India’s position in international climate negotiations, ratings 
were evenly split between “yes” and “no.” These results imply that only some actors 
changed their positions. It is not clear yet how deep the ongoing shift is and what areas 
of climate governance it affects. Most agreed that the change occurred from about 
2008 onwards. Milestones in the development of India’s climate governance included 
the NAPCC process and the Indian government’s promise to reduce emission inten-
sity, as well as some natural disasters and weather phenomena that increased aware-
ness (e.g., floods and monsoon changes).
Several experts identified the appointment of Jairam Ramesh as Minister of the 
Environment and Forests in May 2009 as a turning point. Ramesh’s replacement in 
July 2011 gave rise to the fear that the changes taken thus far were only “Ramesh-
deep” (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011) because his follower Jayanthi Natarajan 
counts as environmentally more conservative and less of a political heavyweight. 
Indeed, Natarajan reinforced the traditional Indian foreign policy position again at the 
international negotiations in Durban 2012, coming close to being a deal-breaker. 
Whether the Indian agreement to the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (which 
may lead to binding mitigation targets for all parties post-2020) is indeed a step for-
ward or a smart negotiation strategy that allows for postponement and realignment 
remains to be seen. The latter would be a step back.
Interview partners in India agreed that, generally, awareness and knowledge have 
increased in the past few years. Particularly the business angle to climate change is 
“really the buzz since 2007 and even stronger since 2009.”14 Business has learnt that 
there are risks attached to climate change that they have to deal with in their com-
pany.15 As in South Africa, the knowledge about climate change in India was unevenly 
spread. The learning process was at different stages as well, depending on the actors, 
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their (business) interests, and—to a lesser extent—their location (national or state/
local). There was a lack of knowledge on some issues, particularly adaptation. A lot of 
contestation was ongoing about whether, what, and how to do something about cli-
mate change, creating confusion. Those actors working closely on climate change 
have started to develop new background knowledge, but this is not shared across actor 
groups. No widely distributed, intersubjective background knowledge has yet come 
about.
Business associations and big business show signs of collective learning, at least 
partly. They learn individually within their own company as well as through their 
peers. The same applies to parts of central government. In general, the reformulation 
of strategies and policy papers as well as the ongoing shift in positions gives sufficient 
reason to believe that at least a single-loop learning process taking place. In some 
areas—such as energy efficiency, solar energy, and CDM—a double-loop learning 
process has occurred. This is supported by the higher regulation density in these fields. 
For cognitive evolution, this means that the cognitive threshold required for the wide-
spread institutionalization of new background knowledge has not yet been passed.
For South Africa, the results indicate that a collective learning process has occurred 
for only some governance actors, but a desire for learning and orientation—and poten-
tially new background knowledge—exists. The nature of change includes new knowl-
edge, debates, and the challenging of underlying perceptions. First, altered actions are 
being taken. This implies at least a double-loop learning process, giving rise to new 
governance measures and thought processes across society. Whether a triple-loop 
learning process is taking place remains to be seen. It depends on the implementation 
of the measures under development.
In comparison, South Africa seems to be further along in the production of new 
background knowledge, but India is more successful in those parts of climate gover-
nance that serve business interests. In both countries, knowledge gaps are greater con-
cerning adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Here, further capacity building is 
required.
The Driving Capacity of Specific Actor Groups
South Africa
Who drives the identified change and how are the actors related to each other? The 
point of departure for the analysis of both cases is the concept of communities of 
practice. The expert judgments targeted communities of practice only and did not ask 
questions that would produce data usable in a formal social network analysis. The 
semistructured interviews contained more open questions suitable for a qualitative 
identification of relevant actors.
The expert survey described the conceptual core features of communities of prac-
tice. Experts were then asked to choose one of three statements that most closely 
reflected the current situation in their country. The South African expert judgments 
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were almost evenly split between those identifying communities of practice but attri-
bute a lack of power to them and those experts who see their number and power grow-
ing, with an influence on change processes (46% vs. 54%, respectively). Some experts 
who chose the former statement commented that, in spite of their choice, they never-
theless see a tendency toward a growth of communities of practice and their power.
The following interview questions targeted the identification of communities of 
practice and other networks: “Who are the most important actors in climate gover-
nance in your country? Who do you collaborate or exchange with on climate change 
questions and practices? Are these contacts personal and regular or not? How would 
you describe these exchanges? Do you feel that you are engaging for the same thing/
are on the same page?” In addition, at the end of the interview, each interviewee was 
asked to recommend other key people in the field worth interviewing. Thus, the tech-
nique here approximated the interview and snowballing methods also used in social 
network analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 2008).
In South Africa, the number of actors working on climate change issues at the 
national level is rather limited. The data obtained made clear that the number of key 
actors actually pushing for climate governance at the national level amounts to around 
15 to 25 people only. The data strongly supported the existence of communities of 
practice bound by trust and a group identity and enabled their identification. There are 
(at least) three communities of practice and many members having links to the trans-
national and international levels. These links may have the form of resource exchange–
based networks or communities of practice.
Communities of practice revolve around the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and—to a lesser extent—the Department of Science and Technology. Another com-
munity of practice involves the Department of Energy and the two major greenhouse 
gas–emitting companies, Eskom and Sasol. The academics (both natural and social 
scientists) form an epistemic community as a specific type of community of practice. 
They split into different communities of practice when it comes to their interactions 
outside of the purely scientific realm. Some are members of South Africa’s delegation 
at the international negotiations and some form a part of the transnational epistemic 
community IPCC, thus connecting domestic and global governance.
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has a significant input 
into the Department of Environmental Affairs climate change team and works closely 
with the Department of Science and Technology as well. Two of the CSIR researchers 
have been repeatedly cited as key people in the interviews and one of them belongs to 
the transnational community of the IPCC. The climatological knowledge exchange—
and development of measures based on it—is complemented by the input of research-
ers from the University of Cape Town (UCT), most notably a scientist of the Climate 
Systems Analysis Group, who take part in the IPCC as well. Another research group 
of the UCT, the Energy Research Center, works on energy and climate questions and 
tries to present different mechanisms to the Department of Energy. Along with a mem-
ber of the nongovernmental organization, SouthSouthNorth, an Energy Research 
Center researcher mainly drove the LTMS process. Thus, they build another community 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 13, 2014jed.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
376  Journal of Environment & Development 21(3)
of practice along with the DoE and researchers from the South African Energy 
Research Institute (SANERI).
Here, the institutional power of communities of practice shows: The LTMS, con-
taining the communities’ knowledge and ideas for practices, has been widely adopted 
and is often used as a reference by governance actors. The LTMS suggestion to commit 
to a peak, plateau, and decline plan in terms of GHG emissions is the South African 
pledge in the Copenhagen accord. Implementation remains to be done, but substantial 
changes in the regulatory framework are underway. Following Pahl-Wostl’s (2009) 
characterization of loop learning, this indicates either double- or triple-loop learning.
The community of practice around the DEA also contains scientists who are more 
concerned with adaptation to the impacts of climate change—these are, primarily, one 
researcher at the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) and, in terms 
of risk management strategies, a researcher at the University of Witwatersrand.
Within the Department of Environmental Affairs, the number of staff working on 
climate change is fairly small. Relationships among team members and between team 
members and advising scientists were repeatedly described as “very personal,” 
“friendly,” or “close,”16 thus pointing toward relationships of trust and even toward 
a “we feeling.” One interviewee from the Department of Environmental Affairs 
described the climate governance landscape in South Africa as being driven by a small 
circle that functions “almost like a closed club.”17 These results clearly point toward 
the constructivist concept of communities of practice, rather than simple, resource 
exchange networks. There are two key individuals within the Department of 
Environmental Affairs who take part in international climate negotiations and who 
drive the domestic policy processes as well, thereby connecting different levels of 
action. Marthinus van Schalkwyk, former minister of the environment, was repeatedly 
cited as a key figure for lifting climate change onto the government’s agenda.
Already in 2004 van Schalkwyk stressed that “we are dealing with not only an 
environmental issue; it [climate change] is centrally an economic, social and sustain-
able development issue as well.”18 It took several more years for this understanding to 
be accepted and internalized by other actors. Differences in views have largely shifted 
to more detailed aspects on how to deal with these challenges, instead of ignoring or 
dismissing climate protection as unimportant. This implies that, first, critical individu-
als are important for the influence of communities of practice. Second, the team sur-
rounding van Schalkwyk—the community of practice in and around the Department 
of Environmental Affairs—has exerted enough productive power over time to estab-
lish this understanding in the public discourse. Generally, however, the Department of 
Environmental Affairs counts as a department with limited power compared to other 
ministries (thus confirming Koch et al., 2007). In turn, this also limits the power of the 
community of practice.
In terms of environmental NGOs, the community of practice around the Department 
of Environmental Affairs has its most influential members within a transnational orga-
nization, the WWF, and, to a lesser extent, among the individuals of Earthlife 
Africa and the Climate Action Partnership. Whether the latter belong to the core of the 
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community of practice is difficult to tell since the exact knowledge and learning pro-
cesses are impossible to trace (without extensive participant observation). The final 
members of this community of practice are two key individuals of the NBI. Several of 
the companies interviewed indicated a community of practice–type link with interna-
tional peers in business associations: They exchange knowledge and best practices, 
learn together, and stimulate each other to take action.19 These transnational communi-
ties of practice overlap somewhat with domestic ones in the private sector.
The third community of practice entails the closely collaborating climate change 
teams of Eskom and Sasol. A formal community of practice may come about in the 
future.20 Both companies, especially Eskom, are not particularly homogeneous enti-
ties. Therefore, it is not clear which company units entertain ties with the Department 
of Energy. Some individuals and units in the companies and the Department of 
Energy advocate against climate protection—or for nuclear energy. The climate 
change teams and other parts of the Department of Energy favor renewable energy, 
mitigation, and adaptation. Various interviewees emphasized that Eskom and Sasol 
are very close to the Department of Energy, indicating a community of practice–type 
link in any case. Generally, Eskom, Sasol, and the Department of Energy have a 
strong influence on the energy components of climate governance. Eskom and Sasol 
are also members of the NBI.
For communities of practice, institutional power means that they spread their 
knowledge and influence decision making and actions beyond their direct area of 
influence, that is, into other ministries, companies, and, finally, society’s background 
knowledge as a whole. The establishment of a climate change team within each min-
istry could be a result of the institutional power of the communities of practice, but 
data here are unclear.
The leading policy processes, such as Green and White Papers, give indications both 
for and against the power of the identified communities of practice. On one hand, the 
communities of practice were successful in initiating the policy processes as well as 
establishing climate change and a basic understanding of it in relevant policy makers’ 
and private actors’ minds. Contrary to what Hallding et al. (2011) find, my data suggest 
that no actor at key level seriously doubts anymore that South Africa has to do some-
thing about climate change now. On the other hand, the repeated postponement of the 
Green and White Papers’ publication reflect the insufficient power of communities of 
practice in pushing their knowledge and ideas through more quickly. Moreover, the col-
laboration between government departments is insufficient, leading to a lack of coherent 
policy. In particular, the Department of Environmental Affairs and the Department of 
Energy could improve their collaborative efforts. A stronger collaboration would show 
in the structure and membership in (the same) communities of practice.
The productive power of communities of practice in terms of shaping the debate 
within governmental circles is higher than in overall society, as particularly scientists 
and members of the Department of Environmental Affairs contribute to a certain fram-
ing of the debate. This framing revolves a lot around energy and mitigation issues and 
coins climate change as an economic and political problem South Africa needs to deal 
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with actively. The debate in society is additionally shaped by the media and the groups 
of civil society that they give room—notably, some NGOs and some vocal climate 
sceptics.21 Results of the interviews and documents here are preliminary and would 
require a full discourse analysis.
Generally, the communities of practice identified succeeded in anchoring climate 
change as a factor to be dealt with in major governance actors’ strategies and decision 
making, even if it is only in a discursive way as a first step. A detailed analysis of the 
knowledge and practices generated within these communities and their tracing goes 
beyond the scope of this article. Yet this description of the driving actor communities 
underlines the importance of power (and the lack of it) and of key figures within com-
munities of practice. Actor networks are indeed bound by trust, have begun to form an 
identity and exchange knowledge, ideas, and practices. In sum, the concept of com-
munities of practice is well suited to capture the actor relations and their relevance for 
South Africa’s changing climate governance.
India
Compared to South Africa, the number of actors operating at the national level is 
much higher in India. However, relationships between actors and their positions are 
not as clear-cut. Interview partners also highlighted that there is strong disagreement 
between actors and actors groups on what to do and how in climate governance. This 
relates to a fragmentation of the science landscape and, to a certain extent, a fragmen-
tation of civil society. The number of scientists working on climate change is high—
so is the number of approaches advanced to deal with climate change. They reflect the 
diversity of disciplines but also differ in quality and sometimes normative background 
of the solutions presented.22 Competition is deemed high.
Although most interviewees affirmed the existence of some sort of networks 
between governance actors, these are not just a handful of small, clearly identifiable 
circles, as in South Africa. The formation of actor constellations, networks, and, 
potentially, communities of practice, seems to be still very much in flux. One expert 
described the situation as “confusing,”23 and another summarized it this way:
In the next few years we’ll see what the actor networks really are that put poli-
cies into place, push for stuff to happen, it’s so much under development still, I 
wouldn’t be able to tell at the moment.24
Yet several interview participants from civil society and with academic/expert 
backgrounds stated that if they or other researchers have influence on government and 
governance processes, it is only because of informal, trust-based relationships or in an 
ad hoc way. This confirms the conceptual point of departure of both a network and a 
community of practice approach.
In the expert survey, two thirds of experts (70%) chose the second statement con-
firming the existence of communities of practice and attesting to their insufficient 
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power and one third of experts (30%) saw an increase in both the existence and the 
power of communities of practice in India. Compared to the results for South Africa, 
a lack of power seems even more relevant for potential communities of practice. Let 
us look now at the information retrieved from the interviews in more detail.
First, the change in staff at the Ministry of Environment and Forests decreased the 
influence of a group of bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats of various departments who 
dominated Indian climate policy for many years. Key figures here were the environ-
mental foreign policy makers Nitin Desai, Prodipto Ghosh, C. Dasgupta, and the for-
mer international chief negotiator, Shyam Saran. Also, the influence of The Energy 
and Resources Institute (TERI) used to be stronger (Biermann, 2002). Desai and 
Dasgupta are now fellows at TERI, and Ghosh is now head of the climate change team 
of FICCI. It can be assumed that they built a community of practice before the shift, 
but, as noted, that time period before 2007 is not the focus of this study.
The Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, set up in 2008, has been impor-
tant for the draft of the NAPCC but lost some of its importance soon after its publica-
tion. The concrete inputs of individuals in the NAPCC remain unclear. “The NAPCC 
has emerged from a curtain of political secrecy,” quotes Rajamani, the consultant, and 
journalist Rahul Goswami (Rajamani, 2009, p. 356). It is only in the process of allocat-
ing the missions of the NAPCC to governmental departments and agencies that power 
struggles became more openly visible. The Ministry of Power and the BEE, for 
instance, struggled over the Energy Efficiency mission, which was finally allocated to 
the BEE. Some interview partners said they were not sure whether the PM council still 
really exists, and others spoke of a devaluation of its role or even a disconnect from 
actual climate governance processes. This was attributed to the strong role of Ramesh 
and his new team of advisers and the establishment of the Low-Carbon Expert Group.
Whether the Low-Carbon Expert Group can count as a community of practice is 
unclear—it may be true for parts of the group, but a “we feeling” or identity building 
for the whole group of 26 experts is uncertain. Trust seems to exist more at the dyadic 
level and within subgroups. Members identified a like-mindedness in the group, mean-
ing a climate change perspective on even economic or technical aspects.25 The group 
split up into different teams targeting specific questions and chapters for the report to 
the Planning Commission. A higher degree of agreement exists among these teams, 
but the chapters at the draft stage reflected very different ideas because each team had 
its own opinions and strategies.
The fragmentation of the scientific community in India leads to the question of 
whether there is one or more epistemic communities or whether there are other com-
munities of practice that include scientists or not. Given that there are more than 120 
institutions concerned with research on climate change (India DST, 2010), an exhaus-
tive answer to this question cannot be given here. The INCCA consists of about 220 
scientists working on different kinds of analyses of climate change. However, the 
National Communication Process has simply been renamed to INCCA (India DST, 
2010, p. 5). This is too large to count as a community of practice. It is a simple net-
work, at least for the time being. Various institutes and universities cooperate, such as 
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the different Indian Institutes of Technology and the Centre for Policy Research. The 
exact number and constitution of these networks across the scientific landscape—as 
well as their qualification as epistemic communities—could not be determined. The 
influence of scientists on government is often informal and ad hoc and depends on 
individual people. Moreover, the influence of particular scientists may change with 
those in power.26 In other policy fields, such as economics, research has a lot more 
influence on government and policy, and relationships between scientists and govern-
ment and bureaucracy are much stronger.27
Many leading experts, bureaucrats, or NGO members working on climate change 
issues have at one point in their professional life worked at TERI. This shows the 
standing that the institute has, or at least used to have, in the field. On one hand, TERI 
is close to business and business interests because it does a lot of consultancy work for 
them. On the other hand, TERI’s influence on climate governance seems to have 
diminished in recent years.28 Ramesh and Rajendra Pachauri, directors of TERI and 
the IPCC, respectively, are reported to have had their differences over the NAPCC 
prior to the Copenhagen summit, followed by a serious fall-out about the IPCC and 
Indian reports on the melting of the Indian Himalayan glaciers in January 2010. It led 
to a cease of communication between them. The influence of Pachauri and TERI on 
India’s domestic climate policy considerably weakened after this.29
Various interview partners stressed the importance of Ramesh and his team of 
younger assistants for the policy process—access to these circles was not possible. 
Hence, no closer analysis whether and what kind of community of practice surrounds 
him is possible. In any case, Ramesh qualifies as a key individual. Katharina 
Michaelowa and Axel Michaelowa (2011) argue that he broadened the camp of “pro-
gressive internationalists” (Dubash, 2009) that he himself belongs to. They ascribe the 
rise in media attention and the stimulation of the domestic public debate partly to the 
international climate conference in Copenhagen, but largely to Ramesh and his good 
relationships with the journalists (Michaelowa & Miachelowa, 2011, p. 17). Since 
their analysis is convincing, Ramesh and his team were thus likely to have a particular 
discursive power.
Concerning civil society, there is a community of practice between individuals of 
the WWF and the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and individuals of the 
Center of Science and Environment (CSE) and the MoEF and potentially another one 
between the CSE and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. For the latter, data 
could not be verified from both sides. The CSE has been influential in the past 
(Stevenson, 2011), which is likely to make their access to the circles of power easier 
than for other NGOs. Although the CSE has opposed domestic climate action in the 
past,30 at least some CSE members changed their view now. According to some 
sources, Ramesh is even called “NGO Minister” by business because he listens more to 
civil society than the previous minister did.31
Almost all interview partners identified the greater influence of big business on 
climate governance, but the means of influence are not clearly discernible. This is 
partly due to the way lobbying is perceived in India. Several interview partners said 
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that lobbying as a concept does not exist openly the way it does in Europe because it 
has a negative image in India. Both CII and FICCI deny that they are lobbyist 
organizations—the president of CII said, “We are not lobbyists, we are advocates” 
(Khandelwal, 2010).
Other governance fields such as industry or economic governance are of higher 
interest to big corporate groups such as the Tata Group and Reliance. Relationships 
between Tata, Reliance, and the central government are said to be very close, even 
though hard evidence on their relationships is not available. There are networks and 
potentially different communities of practice between proclimate parts of CII, FICCI, 
single leading companies, and the MoEF, including support for voluntary commit-
ments under the CDM/Kyoto Protocol. There are also networks of those advocating 
for the opposite—the protection of economic growth interests under all circumstances. 
Members of the CII, FICCI, single companies, and individuals at the Ministry of 
Industry and at the Ministry of Power also form a network and could form another 
community of practice. Ghosh, the head of the climate change task force of FICCI, 
stands more for the old course of Indian climate policy—reflected in his former posi-
tion in the Indian climate negotiations team. Networks between wind energy compa-
nies, such as Suzlon, and the Ministry of Renewable Energy exist, but whether these 
form communities of practice is unclear. The exact size of membership of these net-
works in terms of individuals and whether they qualify as communities of practice 
could not be determined as data on the relationships remained fuzzy.
Content analysis of the interviews indicates more relationships based on resource 
exchange–based networks in the business sector than on identity-building communi-
ties based on group- and dyadic-level trust. Market orientations and cobeneficial 
thinking prevails, which is in line with Stevenson’s findings. She argues that the over-
whelming acceptance and engagement in the CDM was due to a shift in Indian foreign 
and economic policy toward more global market orientation and normative congru-
ence building (Stevenson, 2011).
Generally, business has a stronger driving force than science in Indian domestic 
climate governance. Despite the existence of and the large amount of activities by 
environmental civil society at the national level, they do not have significant influence 
on governance. Moreover, the insights gained here confirm previous research identify-
ing the groups of growth-first stonewallers, progressive realists, and progressive inter-
nationalists (Dubash, 2009; Rajamani, 2009). Although they are certainly ideal types, 
these positions were not significantly reflected in the descriptions of India’s climate 
governance landscape. Most interview partners belonged to the second or third group, 
in favour of India doing its share in climate protection. This supports the notion of an 
ongoing shift toward a normative commitment to climate protection, at least domesti-
cally, till the end of the observation period (12/2010).
Conclusion
This article compared the development and the nature of change in the domestic cli-
mate governance of India and South Africa as well as the actors responsible for these 
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developments. Although the focus was primarily empirical, the explanatory potential 
of the communities of practice concept compared to more simple, resource exchange–
based networks of (formal) social network analysis were tested.
In both countries, a change in domestic climate governance at the national level 
took place between 2007 and 2010. It is still ongoing. The regulation density has 
increased in both countries, with India a step ahead in terms of regulation in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. This is largely due to a longer Indian policy tradition 
in these fields than in South Africa and a significantly higher interest of the private 
sector—mostly to reduce electricity costs and to benefit from international market 
opportunities. For India, the results indicate the existence of at least single-loop learn-
ing or a simple shift in strategies, and in some areas double-loop learning—the change 
of underlying assumptions within structural constraints. The appointment of Ramesh 
as Minister of Rural Development in July 2011 could slow down the change processes, 
given his importance as a driver of India’s domestic actions.
In South Africa, at least double-loop learning has occurred, with the potential for 
transformative triple-loop learning, but a final assessment depends on the implementa-
tion of governance measures. Implementation remains a challenge in both countries. 
Although awareness-raising programs and the closure of knowledge gaps continue to 
be useful here, the challenge of enforcing policies in either country is not specific to 
climate governance.
The analysis of actors driving these developments has shown that there are (at least) 
three communities of practice in South Africa, with a strong input from science, 
whereas the evidence for communities of practice in India is unclear. Here, more 
resource exchange–oriented networks exist that could more closely fit a social net-
work analysis understanding, with a stronger influence of business on climate gover-
nance. Key individuals from government who have (a) a certain understanding of 
climate change, and (b) a positive normative attitude toward climate governance have 
been important in both cases. The adherence of such key individuals to a community 
of practice seems decisive for its formation and the success of cognitive evolution.
A comparison of two cases only does not suffice to conclude that communities of 
practice, trust, and identity building necessarily lead to a higher-order change, and 
hence, more effective climate governance. Still, some conceptual and practical impli-
cations result from the differences between India and South Africa.
A limited number of actors, such as the club-like structure of the climate gover-
nance landscape in South Africa, seem to be conducive to the formation of communi-
ties of practice and collective learning. Promoting trust and identity building between 
stakeholders may prove particularly useful if the number of stakeholder is limited, 
such as in subnational entities or in a specific sector. Incentivizing the building of 
communities of practice to connect bottom-up adaptation initiatives with individual 
companies or parts of government/administration could also be fruitful.
The difference in science’s influence on governance shapes the nature of change in 
India and South Africa in a significant way as well. Scientists’ influence is higher in 
South Africa due to their more concerted voice. The fragmentation of the scientific 
landscape in India and the high degree of competition limits their influence on 
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government. This is an important element explaining the difference in loop learning 
between the countries. For India’s policy makers, strengthening ongoing efforts under 
the knowledge mission of the NAPCC is recommended. In addition, the creation of a 
permanent, interdisciplinary institution centralizing existing climate change compe-
tence in India is an idea worth considering, as suggested by my interview partners. 
Here, the Low-Carbon Expert Group presents a good start.
To what extent a historical affinity of government toward networks and deliberative 
solutions (as in post-apartheid South Africa) or long-standing, rather inert bureaucratic 
structures (as in India) are responsible for the differences between the cases is an inter-
esting question for another study.32 The explanatory power of these different factors 
needs to be explored in more cases and in more depth before the formulation of theory-
improving hypotheses is useful. Conceptually, a community of practice–type approach 
seems more suitable for explaining the impact of certain actor constellations—and the 
development of collective learning processes that leads to far-reaching change—than 
formal network analysis, interested only in structures, does.
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Notes
 1. UNDP, Human Development Report 2010. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
global/hdr2010/
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 3. World Bank. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/
country-and-lending groups#Lower_middle_income
 4. Government of India, Planning Commission, 2006. Integrated Energy Policy, Report of the 
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 6. Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests 2009, India’s GHG Emissions 
Profile: Results of Five Climate Modelling Studies.
 7. World Bank. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/CoP_QA.pdf
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 8. Case selection was part of a larger project; India/South Africa was one resulting pair.
 9. See Netherlands Environmental Agency. Retrieved from http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/
climatechange/faqs#vraag9
10. One South African cent is approximately 0.1 Euro cent.
11. UNFCCC. Retrieved from http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegis-
teredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html
12. The results on knowledge and awareness are based on both experts’ assessment of other 
governance actors’ knowledge and an interpretation of experts’ own knowledge by the 
author.
13. Interview with Government/Administration 1—January 27, 2010, Pretoria.
14. Interview with NGO 3, October 18, 2010, Delhi.
15. Interview with Business 2, October 12, 2010, Delhi.
16. Interviews with Government 3, February 15, 2010, Pretoria; Expert 3, March 2, 2010, Cape 
Town; Expert 5, January 20, 2010, Johannesburg.
17. Interview with Government 3.
18. Statement by the office of Marthinus van Schalkwyk. Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism: Van Schalkwyk urges global partnerships and local action on climate 
change, December 15, 2004, Pretoria.
19. Interviews with, for example, Business 4, February 3, 2010, Pretoria; Business 6, March 3, 
2010, Cape Town; Business 7, March 4, 2010, Cape Town.
20. Interview with Business 3, February 5, 2010, Johannesburg.
21. Interviews with Business 4, February 3, 2010, Pretoria; Government 5, March 2, 2010; 
observation of print media such as Mail and Guardian and Engineering News over various 
years. No methodological content analysis of the media was undertaken.
22. Interview with Academic/Expert 10, November 24, 2010; Academic/Expert 11, November 25, 
2010, Mumbai.
23. Interview with Academic/Expert 9, November 19, 2010, Mumbai.
24. Interview with NGO 1, October 13, 2010, Delhi.
25. For example, interview with Academic/Expert 3, October 28, 2010, Delhi.
26. Interview with Academic/Expert 10, November 24, 2010, Mumbai.
27. Ibid.
28. Interview with NGO 3, October 18, 2010, Delhi.
29. Interview with Embassy 1, November 5, 2010, Delhi.
30. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this article for this point.
31. Interview with Embassy 1, November 5, 2010, Delhi.
32. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this article for this point.
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